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In many geographic regions, both in developing and in developed countries, the number 
of health workers is insufficient to achieve population health goals.  Financial incentives 
for return of service are intended to alleviate health worker shortages: A (future) health 
worker enters into a contract to work for a number of years in an underserved area in 
exchange for a financial pay-off.  
  
Methods 
We carried out systematic literature searches of PubMed, the Excerpta Medica database, 
the Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature, and the National Health 
Services Economic Evaluation Database for studies evaluating outcomes of financial-
incentive programs published up to February 2009.  To identify articles for review, we 
combined three search themes (health workers or students, underserved areas, and 
financial incentives).  In the initial search, we identified 10,495 unique articles, 10,302 of 
which were excluded based on their titles or abstracts.  We conducted full-text reviews of 
the remaining 193 articles and of 25 additional articles identified in reference lists or by 
colleagues.  Forty-two articles were included in the final review.  We extracted from 
these articles information on the financial-incentive programs (names, locations, periods 
of operation, objectives, target groups, definitions of underserved area, financial 
incentives and conditions) and information on the individual studies (authors, publication 
dates, study outcomes, study designs, samples and sample sizes, data sources, outcome 
measures and effect sizes, conclusions, and methodological limitations).  We reviewed 
 
 
2program results (descriptions of recruitment, retention, and satisfaction among program 
participants), program effects (analyses of program effectiveness at the individual level 
regarding provision of care, retention, and participant satisfaction), and program impacts 




Of the 42 reviewed studies 33 investigated financial-incentive programs in the US.  The 
remaining studies evaluated programs in Japan (five studies), Canada (two), New 
Zealand (one) and South Africa (one).  The programs started between 1930 and 1998.  
We identified five different types of programs (service-requiring scholarships, 
educational loans with service requirements, service-option educational loans, loan 
repayment programs, and direct financial incentives).  Financial incentives ranged from 
year-2000 United States dollars 1,358 to 28,470.  All reviewed studies were 
observational.  The random-effects estimate of the pooled proportion of all eligible 
program participants who had either fulfilled their obligation or were fulfilling it at the 
time of the study was 71% (95% confidence interval 60-80%).  Seven studies compared 
retention in the same underserved area between program participants and non-
participants.  Six studies found that participants were less likely to remain in the same 
underserved area (five studies reported the difference to be statistically significant, while 
one study did not report a significance level); one study did not find a significant 
difference in retention in the same area.   Twelve studies compared provision of 
care/retention in any underserved area between participants and non-participants.  Ten 
studies found that participants were more likely to continue to practice in any 
 
 
3underserved area (eight studies reported the difference to be statistically significant, while 
two studies did not provide the results of significance tests); two studies found that 
program participants were significantly less likely than non-participants to remain in any 
underserved area.  Seven studies investigated the satisfaction of participants with aspects 
of their enrolment in financial-incentive programs; three studies examined the satisfaction 
of members of participants’ families with their lives in the undeserved area.  
 
Conclusions 
Financial-incentive programs for return of service are one of the few health policy 
interventions to improve the distribution of human resources for health on which 
substantial evidence exists.  However, the majority of studies are from the US, and only 
one study reports findings from a developing country, limiting generalizability.  The 
existing studies show that financial-incentive programs have placed substantial numbers 
of health workers in underserved areas and that program participants are more likely than 
non-participants to work in underserved areas in the long run, even though they are less 
likely to remain at the site of original placement.  As all existing studies were 
observational and participants self-selected into the programs, the evidence to date does 
not allow the inference that financial-incentive programs have caused increases in health 









In many geographic regions, both in developing and in developed countries, the number 
of health workers is insufficient to achieve population health goals.  The 2004 Joint 
Learning Initiative (JLI) report Human Resources for Health estimated that “Sub-Saharan 
countries must nearly triple their current numbers of workers by adding the equivalent of 
one million workers through retention, recruitment, and training if they are to come close 
to approaching the MDGs [Millennium Development Goals] for health” [1]; the 2006 
World Health Report concluded that “[t]he severity of the health workforce crisis in some 
of the world’s poorest countries is illustrated by WHO estimates that 57 of them (36 of 
which are in Africa) have a deficit of 2.4 million doctors, nurses and midwives” [2].  In 
developed countries, certain areas, such as rural or poor communities, are commonly 
underserved with health workers, leaving substantial proportions of the population 
without access to complete primary health care [3-5].
1   
 
Interventions intended to alleviate health worker shortages include selective recruitment 
and training for practice in underserved areas, improvements in working conditions or 
living conditions, and compulsion or incentives [6].  In this article, we systematically 
review the evidence on one specific set of policy interventions: financial incentives for 
return of service.   These interventions work as follows.  A health worker in training or a 
fully trained health worker enters into a contract to work for a number of years in an 
                                                 
1 In this article, unless otherwise specified, we use the term underserved area to encompass underserved 
communities, regions, and populations within countries, as well as countries where by some standards even 
the best-served geographic regions are underserved.  The precise definition of an underserved area differs 
across the financial incentive programs evaluated in the studies reviewed in this article.  The different 




5underserved area in exchange for a financial pay-off.  Financial incentives can increase 
the numbers of health workers in underserved areas by a number of mechanisms.  First, 
they can redirect the flow of those health workers who would have been educated without 
any financial incentive from well-served to underserved areas, for instance by decreasing 
the net emigration flow of nurses and physicians from developing to developed countries 
[7-9] or by increasing the net flow of physicians from urban tertiary care to rural primary 
care in developed countries [10, 11].  This first mechanism can take hold if there are 
(future) health workers who normally would not work in an underserved area, but who 
are willing to do so in return for a financial incentive.  Second, financial-incentive 
programs can add health workers to the pool of workers who would have been educated 
in the absence of such programs and place them in underserved areas.  The second 
mechanism can take hold if, on the one hand, there are qualified candidates who would 
not have the means to finance a health care education without a financial incentive and, 
on the other hand, a country’s health care education system can absorb additional 
students.  Third, financial-incentive programs can decrease the outflow of health workers 
from underserved areas, if they prolong the retention times in underserved areas of those 
health workers who would have worked in an underserved area even without any 
financial incentive but who participate in a financial-incentive program.  Improved 
retention in this group of health workers can be a direct result of the contractual 
obligation to remain for a certain number of years in an underserved area or can be 
caused by a program’s additional efforts to increase retention (e.g., by increasing health 
workers’ satisfaction with their work environment and career progression, or by 
increasing the satisfaction of health workers’ families with their integration into the 
 
 
6community) [12].  Fourth, the programs can decrease the outflow of participating and 
non-participating health workers from underserved areas by increasing the number of 
health workers in those areas through any of the three mechanisms described above.  
Such positive feedback may occur because increasing the number of health workers can 
diminish reasons for non-retention in rural and remote areas, such as high workload [13-
15], lack of contact with colleagues [14], lack of support from medical specialists [16], or 
social isolation [15]. 
 
We have recently shown that a specific type of financial-incentive program, scholarships 
in return for a commitment to deliver antiretroviral treatment in Sub-Saharan Africa, is 
highly cost-beneficial under a wide range of assumptions [17].  In the following, we will 
first systematically review studies on financial incentives for return of service.  Then, we 
will critically summarize the findings from existing studies and draw implications for 
policy and future research.  One previous study has systematically reviewed the evidence 
on financial-incentive programs for return of service.  Sempowski (2004) reviewed 10 
studies of financial-incentive programs published between January 1966 and July 2002 
[18].  The author concluded that “ROS [return-of-service] programs to rural and 
underserviced areas have achieved their primary goal of short-term recruitment but have 
had less success with long-term retention” [18].  Prima facie, an update of this systematic 
review is useful because more than six years have passed since the end of the period of 
publication of articles considered therein.  In addition to the update of evidence, our 
review differs from the previous one in two aspects.   First, the previous review was 
restricted to studies of physicians, while we consider studies of all types of health 
 
 
7workers.  Second, the previous review focused on program results (i.e., descriptions of 
outcomes among program participants without comparison to outcomes in non-
participants) [18], while our review includes program results, program effects (i.e., 
analysis of program effectiveness at the individual-level through comparison of outcomes 
among participants and non-participants), and program impacts (i.e., analysis of program 
effectiveness at the population level, such as changes in physicians density or population 
mortality) (Table 1). 
 
Methods 
Data sources and search strategies 
We carried out a systematic literature search in four electronic databases: PubMed [19] in 
order to cover articles on financial-incentive programs published in the medical literature; 
the Excerpta Medica database (EMBASE) [20] in order to cover articles in medical 
journals that are not included in PubMed, in particular European journals [21]; the 
Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL) [22] in order to 
cover articles published in the literature on nursing and allied health professions; and 
National Health Services Economic Evaluation Database (NHS EED) [23] in order to 
cover health economics studies.  We used the Cochrane Library to search in NHS EED 
[23].  Because MEDLINE records were included in the m search, we excluded 
MEDLINE records in both the EMBASE and the CINAHL search.   No search option to 
exclude MEDLINE records was available in NHS EED.  In order to detect any early 
financial-incentive program, we searched the literature from the earliest date at which 
records were available in each of the four databases given our search strategies (see 
 
 
8below).  We searched all four databases on 31 January 2009 and included all relevant 
articles available in the databases up to the search date.  In addition, we searched the 
reference lists of all publications included in the final review as well as of all articles that 
were excluded from the review because they were review articles, editorials, or 
commentaries.  Finally, we asked colleagues with a research interest in human resources 
for health to identify articles on financial incentives for return of service.   
 
To identify articles for review, we combined three search themes using the Boolean 
operator “and”: health workers or students, underserved areas, and financial incentives.  
We combined several search terms with the Boolean operator “or” in order to 
operationalize the search themes.  We drew the search terms from the controlled 
vocabularies used for subject indexing in PubMed (i.e., Medical Subject Headings 
(MeSH) [24]), EMBASE (i.e., EMTREE [25]), and CINAHL (i.e., CINAHL Subject 
Headings [26]).  We used all search terms from the controlled vocabularies in their 
“exploded” versions.  That is, in addition to the selected terms, all narrower terms that are 
categorized below it in the vocabulary hierarchies were included in the searches.  While 
MeSH are available in NHS EED when searched through the Cochrane Library, we 
entered the search terms in all searchable, subject-specific fields (title, keyword, and 
abstract), because such a search strategy has been found to be superior to MeSH-based 
strategies in NHS EED [27].  The Appendix shows the four search algorithms. 
 
Selection criteria 
Articles were considered for inclusion in the systematic review if they reported data from 
a quantitative study of results, effects, or impacts of at least one financial-incentive 
 
 
9program for return of service.  We considered articles published in any language.  We 
excluded studies that evaluate programs that attempt to increase the number of health 
workers in underserved areas primarily through non-financial means [28-32].  For 
instance, studies evaluating the Physician Shortage Area Program (PSAP) of Jefferson 
Medical College were excluded because the program strives to increase the number of 
rural family physicians primarily through selective admission of candidates to medical 
school and through intensive exposure of the program participants to rural family 
practice, while offering only “a small amount of additional financial aid […] almost 
entirely in the form of repayable loans”, which “represents only a small portion of each 
student’s entire tuition and expenses” (Rabinowitz et al. 2005).  Reviews, commentaries, 
editorials, news and policy briefs were excluded.  Studies of financial incentives for 
return of service within the military (e.g., [33]) were excluded because experiences with 
return-of-service programs in the military are likely to be very different from civilian 
experiences, as the military can exert more control over its members than most civilian 
institutions over citizens.  Studies of financial incentives for research positions (e.g., [34]) 
were excluded because health workers who conduct medical research are commonly 
motivated by very different factors than health workers in patient care [35], and this 
article’s objective is to examine the evidence on financial incentives for return of patient 
care in underserved areas.   We further excluded studies of financial incentives to enroll 
in a specific residency program [36] unless they were explicitly linked to work in 
underserved areas, and studies investigating the attractiveness of hypothetical financial-
incentive programs [37].  After exclusion of 131 duplicate records, our searches 
identified a total of 10,495 articles, 10,302 of which were excluded based on their titles or 
 
 
10abstracts.  We conducted full-text reviews of the remaining 193 articles and of 25 
additional articles identified in reference lists or by colleagues.   Forty-two articles were 
included in the final review.  We did not apply any language restrictions in our search.  
However, all reviewed titles and abstracts were available in English (some as translations 
of original-language versions) and all articles included in the final review were published 
in English.  
 
< Figure 1 > 
 
Statistical analysis 
We used DerSimonian and Laird meta-analysis [38] to compute both fixed- and random-
effects estimates of the pooled recruitment proportion (and its 95% confidence interval 
(CI)).  We defined the recruitment proportion as the proportion of program participants 
who had ever been eligible to fulfill their service obligation who had either fulfilled it or 
were fulfilling it at the time of the study.  Participants were eligible for service if they had 
completed the required minimum medical training and were not ineligible, e.g., because 
of disease or because they had temporarily deferred the service.  For the meta-analysis, 
both the recruitment proportion of a program and the total number of eligible program 
enrollees is required.  The meta-analysis assumes that the measure to be pooled across 
studies is normally distributed.  We used the arcsine-transformation to normalize the 
distribution of the recruitment proportions [39].  After meta-analysis of the transformed 
variable, we retransformed the pooled mean and its 95% CI back to proportions.  
Heterogeneity of the recruitment proportion across studies was diagnosed with the Q test 
 
 




Table 1 describes the outcomes that were investigated by the 42 studies included in the 
review and the number of studies investigating each outcome (in parentheses).  Twenty-
four studies investigated 1 outcome; nine studies investigated 2 outcomes; seven studies 
investigated 3 outcomes; and one study investigated 4 outcomes.  Two published articles 
report outcomes from the same study [41, 42]. 
 
< Table 1 > 
 
Table 2 shows descriptions of each of the programs that were evaluated in at least one of 
the included studies.  When information on some program characteristics was not 
available in the reviewed study itself, we extracted the information from other sources 
(shown in the column “Other sources” in Table 2).  All monetary values in the column 
“Financial incentives and conditions” in Table 2 are shown both as they are provided in 
the reviewed study and – for ease of comparison – in year-2000 United States dollars 
(USD).  We used the purchasing power parity index from the World Bank Development 
Indicators [43] in order to translate the values of a non-US currency into US dollars and 
the consumer price index from the US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics 




12The programs evaluated in the studies included in this review started between 1930 and 
1998.  With the exception of five programs that accepted a range of health professionals 
(the North Carolina Rural Loan Program, the National Health Service Corps (NHSC), the 
West Virginia Recruitment and Retention Community Project, the West Virginia State 
Loan Repayment Program in the US, and the Friends of Mosvold Program in South 
Africa), the financial incentives of the evaluated programs were targeted only at future or 
current physicians (Table 2).   
With the exception of three programs that cover, respectively, “tuition, entrance and 
equipment fees and living expenses” [45], university tuition, fees and “other reasonable 
educational expenses, such as books, supplies, and equipment” [46], and “funds for 
university tuition, books, residence fees and food” [47], precise monetary values of the 
financial incentives of the different programs were given in the reviewed studies.  The 
financial incentives per year of service ranged from year-2000 USD 1,358 to 28,470 
(Table 2).  One study compared the average award amount across five types of programs 
(scholarship programs, loan programs with service option, loan repayment programs, 
direct financial-incentive programs, and resident support) and did not find significant 
differences [48].  
 
< Table 2 > 
 
We identified 42 studies that met all our inclusion and exclusion criteria.  The previous 
systematic review of the financial-incentive programs for return of service by Sempowski 
[18] identified only 10 articles, three of which were not included in our review.  Two 
 
 
13articles were not included because they evaluated a program that “tried to increase the 
number of health workers in underserved areas primarily through non-financial means” 
[49, 50] (Figure 1); one study was not included  because it did not report “data from a 
quantitative study of results, effects, or impacts of financial incentives for return of 
service” [51] (see “Selection criteria” above).  Of the 32 articles covered in our study but 
not included in the previous review, 17 were not included in the previous review because 
they were published after the end of its review period (i.e., after 2002) [11, 48, 52-65]; 
the remaining 10 studies were not included because of differences in inclusion and 
exclusion criteria.  In particular, our review considers programmatic outcomes and health 
worker types that were not covered in the previous review (see “Introduction” above). 
 
Of the 42 reviewed studies, 33 investigated financial-incentive programs in the US, 23 of 
which evaluated the NHSC; 8 evaluated programs in specific US states or communities; 1 
evaluated both the NHSC and state-based programs; and 1 evaluated the national 
Commonwealth Fund Medical Undergraduate Scholarship Program.  Five studies 
investigated the Jichi Medical University (JMU) program in Japan, two assessed the 
Ontario Under-serviced Area Program (UAP) in Canada, and one study each evaluated 
the New South Wales Department of Health Rural Resident Medical Officer Program 
(Cadetship Program) in New Zealand and the Friends of Mosvold Scholarship Scheme 
(FOMSS) in South Africa.
2  Table 3 describes the study outcomes, study designs, sample 
criteria, sample sizes, data sources, outcome measures, effect sizes, conclusions, and 
methodological limitations of all studies included in the review.  Sample sizes across the 
                                                 
2 One study evaluated jointly the NHSC and US state programs (see Table 2).  It is included in the count of 
both studies evaluating the NHSC and studies evaluating US state programs. 
 
 
14thirty-seven studies in which individuals were the unit of observation ranged from 24 to 
493,142 (Table 3).  Seventeen studies had sample sizes greater than 1,000, and four had 
sample sizes greater than 50,000. 
 
< Table 3 > 
 
Types of financial-incentive programs for return of service 
In our review, we identified five different types of financial-incentive programs for return 
of service, viz.: service-requiring scholarships (or “conditional scholarships”) (e.g., [57, 
66]), educational loans with service requirements (e.g., [67]), service-option educational 
loans (e.g., [68]), loan repayment programs (e.g., [48]), and direct financial incentives 
(e.g., [69]) (see Table 2).  These program types differ according to the following criteria: 
time of commitment and time of money receipt, spending restrictions, and type of 
commitment.  First, in the case of service-requiring scholarships, educational loans with 
service requirements, and service-option loans, people commit to participation in a 
program before or early in the course of their health care education and receive money 
during the education.  In the case of loan repayment programs and direct financial 
incentives, people commit to participation after completion of their health care education.  
Direct financial incentives are commonly paid at the beginning of service in an 
underserved area while loan repayments are commonly made after each period of service 
in an underserved area (e.g., every three or six months).  Second, while direct financial 
incentives can be used for any purpose, the money from any of the other four programs 
must be spent on health care education either during the education (in the case of service-
requiring scholarships, educational loans with service requirements, and service-option 
 
 
15educational loans) or after the education to repay educational debt (in the case of loan 
repayment programs).  Finally, people who participate in service-requiring scholarships, 
loan repayment, or direct financial-incentive programs commit to work in an underserved 
area, while those receiving educational loans with service requirements commit to service 
and financial repayment.  Individuals who receive service-option educational loans 
commit to either service or financial repayment.  While all service-option educational 
loans offer a choice between service and repayment of the financial incentive, some of 
the programs belonging to the other four types offer a buy-out option.  The difference 
between service-option loans and service-requiring scholarships with a buy-out option is 
that the managers of the former will normally consider repayment and service equally 
desirable outcomes, whereas the managers of the latter will prefer service over buy-out.  
Given equal financial incentives a buy-out is thus commonly more expensive than the 
financial repayment of a service-option educational loan [70].  Note that many loan 
repayment programs do not require a buy-out option because the programs pay 
participants after each period they have served in an underserved area. 
 
Program result: recruitment 
The recruitment proportion varied between 33% and 100% across programs (Table 3).  
Fourteen studies reported, for 25 individual financial-incentive programs, both the 
recruitment proportion and the total number of participants who had ever been eligible to 
serve their obligation (or values from which these two variables could be calculated) [45, 
 
 
1656-58, 66, 68, 71-73].
3  The random-effects pooled recruitment proportion across these 
25 programs was 71% (95% CI 60-80%, heterogeneity p < 0.001). 
 
Program participants who were available for practice but did not fulfill their commitment 
to work in an underserved area either defaulted on their obligation or bought out of it.  Of 
the 25 programs included in the meta-analysis, only four did not offer a buy-out option 
[57, 66, 67, 72].  Some programs allowed participants to repay half [74] or all [71, 75] of 
the principal without interest in lieu of service repayment.  Other programs set the buy-
out price at the principal plus interest (the “prevailing rate of interest”, or a fixed rate of 
interest varying between 2% and 10% [68]), while yet other programs charged a buy-out 
price of the principal plus a penalty (“principal plus penalty up to 100%”, or “triple the 
loan amount plus interest” [56]).  The random-effects pooled recruitment proportion 
across those programs that did not offer a buy-out option (84%, 95% CI 73-92%, 
heterogeneity p < 0.001) was not significantly higher (overall test of heterogeneity 
between subgroups, p = 0.652) than the pooled recruitment proportion across those 
programs that did allow buy-out (67%, 95% CI 55-79%, heterogeneity p < 0.001).   
 
Program result: retention 
The proportion of program participants who remained in underserved areas after 
completing their obligation ranged from 12% to 90% across the eighteen articles that 
reported retention results [41, 42, 45, 56, 57, 61-63, 67, 68, 71, 74-80].  The reported 
proportions, however, could not be meaningfully compared to each other, because the 
                                                 
3 Three studies reported recruitment proportions in the same program, using highly overlapping samples of 
participants [45, 59, 62].  Of the three studies we only included the one with the largest sample size in the 
meta-analysis [45].  
 
 
17definition of retention, the length of time during which participants were included in the 
sample (enrolment period), and the length of time between the end of the enrolment 
period and the time when retention results are observed (lag time) varied widely across 
studies.  The studies measured retention in any underserved area [45, 57, 61, 63, 75, 77-
80], in any underserved area in a specific state [68, 74], in any area in a specific state or 
prefecture [45, 56, 61, 62], in the underserved area of original program placement [41, 
42, 56, 67, 71, 77, 78], or in a practice entered during a specific period of time [76].  
Three articles reported the retention intentions of program participants who were 
fulfilling their obligations at the time rather than actual retention [41, 42, 79].  All of the 
other 15 articles described outcomes of retrospective cohort studies.  One of the fifteen 
studies did not report an enrolment period or lag time [68].  Enrolment periods in the 
remaining 14 studies were four [76, 77], five [71], nine [78], ten [57], eleven [58], 
fourteen [75], eighteen [63, 67, 80], twenty [62], twenty-three [74], twenty-four [45], 
twenty-five [56], and twenty-six [61] years.  There was no lag between enrolment and 
observation in five studies [45, 56, 67, 71, 74]; lag times in the other studies were 1 [58, 
63, 76, 80], 6 [57], 8 [78], 11 [77], and 29[75] years; two studies assessed retention 
results after three different lag times (3, 7 and 9 years [61] and 9, 13, and 15 years [62]) 
 
Program effects: retention and care 
In all 16 studies of program effects, program participation was defined as having received 
a financial incentive and having served the obligation; i.e., people who received a 
financial incentive but could not be recruited to serve in an underserved area were 
excluded from the cohorts of program participants.  Table 4 shows four categories of 
effect studies by outcome and sample.  Three categories of studies investigated retention 
 
 
18(in the same area, in the same underserved area, or in any underserved area), and one 
category investigated provision of care in any underserved area. 
 
< Table 4 > 
 
Five of the seven studies that compared retention in the same (underserved) areas 
between program participants and non-participants found that participants were 
significantly less likely to remain in the same (underserved) area [12, 48, 53, 81, 82], 
while one of the studies did not report a significance level but found a substantially 
higher retention in non-NHSC physicians than in NHSC physicians [83], and another did 
not find a significant difference [58].  In contrast, 10 of the 12 studies that compared 
differences in retention or provision of care in any underserved area between participants 
and non-participants found that participants were more likely to continue to practice in 
any underserved area [53, 84] or to provide care to underserved populations [11, 52, 59, 
60, 65, 84-87].  These differences were shown to be statistically significant in eight of the 
ten studies [11, 52, 53, 65, 84-87].  Two studies did not provide the results of significance 
tests [59, 60].  Two of the twelve studies reported a converse finding: program 
participants were significantly less likely than non-participants to remain in any 
underserved area [60, 81], 
 
The studies of program effects reported either hazard ratios [48, 81], odds ratios [12, 52, 
65, 85, 87], relative risks (or two proportions) [11, 58-60, 82, 84], or beta-coefficients 
[53, 86] to compare retention or care provision among program participants and non-
 
 
19participants.  Except for the two studies that reported hazard ratios, which took into 
account the duration of retention of each individual in the sample [48, 81], and one study 
that used the proportion of underserved patients as its dependent variable [86], these 
studies used a binary concept of retention or care provision measured at different time 
intervals after an initial observation (at least 1 year [58], 1-28 years [65], or 3 years and 1 
month and 5 years and 1 month [12]) or after graduation from medical school (0-16 [59], 
0-26 [60], 7-9 [53], 7 and 11 [84], 9-10 [85, 87], 10-11 [86], 10-20 [82] or up to 29 [52] 
years, or an unknown time interval [11]).   
 
Program results and effects: participant satisfaction and family satisfaction 
Seven studies investigated the satisfaction of participants with aspects of their enrolment 
in financial-incentive programs [12, 41, 58, 67, 76, 77], viz. satisfaction with the overall 
experience in the program [48, 58, 67, 77], satisfaction with work [12, 41, 48, 58, 76] or 
personal life [12, 41, 76] in the underserved areas, or satisfaction with aspects of program 
administration [58, 67].  Three studies examined the satisfaction of members of 
participants’ families with their lives in the undeserved area [41, 48, 76].  Four of the 
seven studies investigated satisfaction outcomes in the NHSC [12, 41, 76, 77]; the three 
other studies examined satisfaction outcomes in US state programs [48, 58, 67].  
 
While the studies on participant and family satisfaction were too few to draw any strong 
generalized inferences, a contrast emerged between the NHSC and the US state 
programs.  Three studies measured overall satisfaction with financial-incentive programs 
in US states by asking participants whether they would enroll again in the same program 
 
 
20[48, 58, 67].  They found a high (counterfactual) willingness to enroll again: 71% of 
interviewed participants in the North Carolina Rural Loan Program answered “yes” to the 
re-enrolment question [67]; 73% of interviewed participants in four programs in West 
Virginia answered either “definitely yes” or “probably yes” to the re-enrolment question 
[58]; and 90% of interviewed participants in US state programs indicated that they would 
“definitely” or “likely” enroll again [48].  In contrast, a study analyzing 183 unstructured 
written accounts of time in the NHSC found that only 20% of participants rated their 
experience as “positive”, while 80% rated it either “negative”, “mixed or ambivalent”, or 
“neutral” [77].  A similar contrast emerged in the comparison of NHSC and US state-
based programs across different aspects of participant work and personal-life satisfaction 
(see Table 3).  For instance, in a study of state-based programs, Pathman and colleagues 
found that more than 80% of program participants were “satisfied with practice”, more 
than 90% found their “work rewarding”, and more than 70% felt “a sense of belonging to 
the community,” while a comparison group of non-obligated physicians scored 
significantly lower on all three dimensions of satisfaction [12].  Conversely, in a study of 
the NHSC, Pathman and colleagues found that participants rated their satisfaction level 
between “dissatisfied” and “neutral” for 7 of 15 “work issues” and “personal-life” issues, 
while participants’ satisfaction level exceeded “satisfied” for only one issue (“[c]aring for 
needy patients”), while non-obligated physicians rated their satisfaction significantly 
higher for 9 of 15 issues for which a comparison was made and significantly lower for 





21Program impacts: health system and health 
Six articles examined whether financial-incentive programs have led to changes in the 
number or density (i.e., number per population) of certain types of health workers [55, 
64, 69, 71, 74, 88].  One of the five studies described the medical student density in 
Arizona over time and concluded that a scholarship aiming to increase student density 
was not effective [74].  Two studies compared changes over time – in physician numbers 
(from 1966 to 1972 [71]) and in physician densities (from 1956 to 1986 [69]) – in 
northern Ontario to changes in the same measures in Ontario as a whole, in order to 
investigate the impact of a financial-incentive program on the supply of physicians in 
underserved areas in northern Ontario.  The first study concluded that an observed 
increase in the absolute number of physicians in northern Ontario was likely caused by 
the program (because the speed of increase rose substantially after introduction of the 
program in northern Ontario, while there was no change in the speed of increase in 
Ontario overall) [71].  The second study concluded that an increase in physician density 
in northern Ontario was not due to the program but due to the overall increase of 
physicians in the province (because a measure of inequality between physician density in 
northern Ontario and Ontario as a whole did not improve) [69].  It is possible that an 
initial effect of the program in the first three years after its introduction (from 1969 to 
1972) – as reported in the first study [71] – ceased to exist in the longer run (until 1986) – 
as reported in the second study [69].  A fourth study used data from the American 
Medical Association Masterfile to model the practice location choices of US physicians 
in sequential multinomial logit regression.  The parameter estimates of NHSC 
participation from the regression equation were then used to predict the supply of 
physicians in underserved areas, assuming the NHSC had not existed.  Through 
 
 
22comparison of this counterfactual to the status quo, the study concluded that elimination 
of the NHSC would lead to a 10-11% decrease in the supply of physicians in underserved 
areas [64]. 
 
Two further studies of health system impacts of financial-incentive programs used 
communities as units of observation.  One of the studies investigated whether 
underserved areas that succeed in attracting obligated physicians were different from 
communities that failed to do so.  It found that communities that were economically 
worse-off and had worse population health were less likely to receive an obligated 
physician than communities that were economically better-off and had better population 
health [88].  The second study investigated whether the presence of an obligated 
physician in a community changed the supply of non-obligated physicians in that 
community and found that, when controlling for a range of demographic, economic, and 
health systems factors, counties staffed by NHSC clinicians experienced a larger increase 
in non-NHSC primary care physicians per population than counties without NHSC 
clinicians [55].  Only one study analyzed the effect of a financial-incentive program on a 
health outcome [54].  The study compared age-adjusted all-cause mortality rates in two 
periods, 15 years apart, in underserved communities with different levels of staffing by 
obligated physicians.  It found no clear relationship between the level of staffing and 
changes in mortality.  
 
Causal inferences 
Causal inferences from studies reporting program results were necessarily weak, because 
the studies merely described outcomes in individuals who were enrolled in financial-
 
 
23incentive programs and did not allow comparison to individuals who did not receive 
financial incentives.  Analyses of program effects, on the other hand, were based on 
comparisons of cohorts of program participants and non-participants.  Causal inferences 
from comparisons of outcomes in the two cohorts, however, can be invalid if there are no 
controls for differences between participants and non-participants.   
 
Of the 16 studies of program effects, 10 controlled for additional variables in the 
comparison of retention and provision of care between people who did and did not 
participate in a financial-incentive program [12, 52, 53, 65, 81, 84-87, 89].  Seven of 
these studies controlled for sex of the health worker [52, 53, 65, 85-87, 89], five 
controlled for ethnicity [52, 53, 85-87], three for medical specialty [52, 81, 89], three for 
age [53, 87, 89], two for growing up in an underserved area [86, 87], one for marital 
status [89], one for the type of medical school a participant had attended (private vs. 
public, receiving vs. not receiving Title VII-funding [65]
4), and one for debt, medical 
school experience in an underserved area, and residency experience in an underserved 
area [87].  One study assessed and then controlled for measures of community-physician 
match and physician and family satisfaction with working and living in the placement 
community [12].   Another study did not show the particular control variables used, but 
reported that its effect measures remained significant “while controlling for selected 
characteristics of physicians” [84].  
 
                                                 
4 In the US, “Title VII grants are intended to strengthen the primary care educational infrastructure 
at medical schools and residency programs and to encourage physicians-in-training to pursue careers 
working with underserved populations” [65]. 
 
 
24While a number of studies controlled for differences in observed characteristics between 
participants and non-participants, only one study of program effects attempted to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity in program participation.  The study used a bivariate probit 
selection model to control for the potential bias due to selective participation [53].  In 
order to identify the program effect, the study used four medical school characteristics, 
viz. the “historical proportion of graduates specializing in primary care”, the “quality of 
the school”, a “tuition index”, and a “public school indicator”, assuming that these 
variables affected selection into financial-incentive programs but did not affect provision 
of care or retention in underserved areas other than through their effect on program 
participation.  One study of program impact (by the same author) used the same medical 
school characteristics as identifying variables in a joint model of program participation 
and practice location decisions [64].  
 
Four of the six other studies of program impacts observed changes over time in the 
availability of a financial-incentive program and an outcome (number or density of health 
workers [69, 71, 74] or mortality [69]), but did not control for changes over time of any 
other variable.  Thus, in these studies it could not be ruled out that an observed 
relationship or the apparent lack of a relationship between program participation and 
outcome was due to a confounding variable.  In addition, three of the six studies [69, 71, 
88] may have suffered from ecological bias [90] because they observed variables at a 
level of aggregation that was higher than the level at which inferences were made.  For 
instance, Anderson and Rosenberg (1990) [69] observed changes in physicians density in 
counties in order to evaluate the impact of the Ontario Underserviced Area Program in 
 
 
25attracting physicians to underserved communities within those counties.  Thus, the 
observed average change in physician density in any one county could have been caused 
by an infinite number of combinations of changes of different directions and effect sizes 
in the different underserviced and sufficiently serviced communities in the county.  
 
Discussion 
Of the 42 studies included in the review, 33 evaluated financial-incentive programs 
located in the US.  The remainder examined programs in other developed countries 
(Japan, Canada, New Zealand), with but one exception that described a program in South 
Africa.  The US financial-incentive programs have placed substantial numbers of health 
workers in underserved areas.   For instance, between 1972 and 2008, the NHSC – the 
largest financial-incentive program in the US – placed 27,000 primary care clinicians in 
underserved areas [91].  At the same time, the US programs have met only a small 
proportion of national unmet health care need.  In February 2008, 4,600 NHSC clinicians 
were serving 5 million people in underserved areas, while the NHSC estimated that 53 
million people “still lack access to quality health care in the United States” [91]. 
 
While most of the evaluated programs were located in the US, the US market for health 
care education is unusual in comparison to many other countries in that students pay high 
tuition for their education.  Countries where students of health care do not usually incur 
large debt (such as many Western and Eastern European countries, Cuba, Malaysia, and 
Saudi Arabia) may not be as successful as the US in recruiting students and health 
professionals into programs that provide scholarships or repayment of educational loans 
 
 
26in return for service in underserved areas.  In many developing countries, by contrast, 
education for a health profession can be quite costly because of tuition and school fees as 
well as costs of housing and living.  Some of the experiences from the US may thus be 
more applicable to health care education markets in developing countries than to other 
developed countries.  On the other hand, (future) health workers in the US have many 
options for funding their education, while funding opportunities for education may be 
few in developing countries.  Thus, the generalizability of US findings to other countries 
where students have substantial financing need for health care education may be limited 
because the selection into financial-incentive programs for underserved service may 
depend on the availability of funding alternatives.  Numerous other differences, such as 
in the capacity to enforce and monitor obligated service (compare [92]), may limit the 
generalizability of the studies included in this review to other settings.  One study from 
South Africa suggests that scholarship programs for health care education can be a 
successful instrument to recruit health workers for practice in rural Africa [66].  Future 
studies should evaluate outcomes of financial-incentive programs from other developing 
countries where such programs have been offered in the past or are currently offered, 
such as Swaziland [93], Ghana [94], and Mexico [95]. 
 
Notwithstanding the above caveats about generalizability, it is useful to summarize some 
of the key findings from our review.  First, most of the financial-incentive programs 
experienced substantial losses to recruitment before the start of the service obligation.  
Across the 25 programs included in the meta-analysis in our review, on average about 3 
in 10 participants did not fulfill their commitment to work in an underserved area.  
 
 
27However, there was wide variation in loss to recruitment.  As reported previously by 
Pathman and colleagues [48] and Jackson and colleagues [58], state programs in the US 
that committed students to service (service-requiring scholarships and educational loans 
with service requirements) had significantly lower recruitment proportions than state 
programs that committed health workers after their training (direct financial incentives 
and loan repayment programs).  This finding is not surprising, because preferences 
change over time.  For instance, students who found careers in primary care appealing at 
entry into medical school may develop a strong interest in highly specialized health care 
during their training, which depends on technology that is usually not available in 
underserved areas.  
 
Furthermore, we find that the recruitment proportion did not differ significantly between 
programs that offered a buy-out option and those that did not.  While this result suggests 
that participants who have decided not to serve their obligation will do so independent of 
the conditions of the program they are enrolled in, it is important to note that the 
proportion of participants who would have taken up work in underserved areas had they 
not enrolled in a specific financial-incentive program is unknown.  Thus, it is impossible 
to infer the relative recruitment effectiveness of different types of programs from such 
comparisons.  
 
Second, participants in financial-incentive programs were significantly more likely to 
leave their first site of practice after completion of their obligation than non-obligated 
health workers in comparable sites of first practice after similar lengths of service.  There 
 
 
28may be several reasons for this finding.  For one, those health workers who find practice 
in any underserved area less attractive than practice in sites that are not underserved, but 
who nevertheless decide to complete their obligation, are likely to leave the underserved 
area once they have completed their obligated service.  On the other hand, even among 
those health workers who find practice in an underserved area to be the most attractive 
career path in general, the obligated health workers may be more likely to leave the site 
of initial practice than their non-obligated colleagues in underserved areas.  Obligated 
health workers have less choice over the particular underserved area in which they first 
practice than their non-obligated peers and are thus less likely to be satisfied with their 
work and life in the underserved area of first practice than their non-obligated peers.  For 
instance, one study of the NHSC concludes that NHSC enrollees “placed in rural sites in 
the late 1980s experienced a site-matching process that they felt offered few acceptable 
sites” and “offered little opportunity to locate the best-suited site among those offered” 
[12].  Financial-incentive programs aiming to achieve high retention of obligated health 
workers in the site of first practice should attempt to accommodate health workers’ 
wishes to practice in a particular underserved area to the greatest extent possible. 
 
Third, while participants in financial-incentive programs for return of service in 
underserved areas were less likely to remain in their site of first practice than non-
participants, the reviewed studies suggest that participants were more likely to practice in 
some underserved area or to work with an underserved population than their peers who 
did not participate in a financial-incentive program.  This summary finding from our 
systematic review is in contrast to the conclusion of the one previous review of financial 
 
 
29incentives for return of service, which concluded that incentive programs “have achieved 
their primary goal of short-term recruitment but have had less success with long-term 
retention” [18].   
 
Many of the analyses of retention in studies in this review compared the behavior of 
participants in financial-incentive programs to that of non-participants, controlling for a 
few observed characteristics of health workers, such as sex, age, ethnicity, or marital 
status.   However, since participants self-selected into programs, it is difficult to identify 
whether any difference in behavior between participants and non-participants was due to 
unobserved characteristics distinguishing participants from non-participants or due to 
program effects.  It is possible that those health workers with the strongest preferences to 
serve underserved populations chose to participate in financial-incentive programs and 
that these unobserved preferences fully explain the different work and retention patterns 
in participants and non-participants, i.e., participants would have worked for exactly the 
same (or longer) lengths of time in underserved areas without the program incentives 
they received.   
 
An ideal strategy to identify causal effects of financial-incentive programs is randomized 
controlled trials.  However, since program participation is an individual choice, it will be 
impossible to randomize individuals into program participation and control arms.  While 
it would theoretically be possible to randomize cohorts of medical students (e.g., by year 
of graduation or by medical school) to financial-incentive offers of different sizes, such a 
randomization strategy may not be politically or administratively feasible.  An alternative 
 
 
30strategy to identify causal effects involves the use of statistical models that control for 
selection into financial-incentive programs on unobserved individual characteristics.  
Two studies in this review (one of program effect [53] and one of program impact, which 
starts with program effect estimation [64]) implemented selection models of program 
participation.  The two studies used medical school characteristics to identify program 
effect.  However, the type of medical school students attend is likely to be related not 
only to the decision to enroll in financial-incentive programs, but also – independent of 
program participation – to the decision to work in underserved areas.  For instance, 
students with strong preferences to work in underserved areas may be more likely than 
their peers with weaker preferences for such care to select medical schools with a high 
“historical proportion” of graduates pursuing careers in primary care, because such 
schools are likely to focus on medical education relevant for underserved areas.  This 
selection may determine work location decisions, independent of any effect the medical 
school characteristic may have on participation in financial-incentive programs.  Thus the 
characteristic may not be a valid variable to identify program effects.   Despite the 
difficulty in finding variables to identify program effects in selection models, future 
studies using already-existing data should emphasize control of biases due to selection on 
unobserved variables in the analyses.  Policy makers who are planning new programs 
should consider adopting experimental designs, such as cluster randomizing financial-





31Fourth, financial-incentive programs varied substantially in the level of participant 
satisfaction.  Participants in some programs were more satisfied than non-participants 
with their work and personal life in underserved areas, while the converse was true for 
other programs.  Health workers’ satisfaction with work and personal life in underserved 
areas is important for several reasons.  For one, health worker satisfaction influences 
retention, as has been shown in several studies [96-98], including in studies of financial-
incentive programs for return of service [12, 41, 63].  Moreover, health worker 
satisfaction is associated with patient satisfaction [99] and quality of care [100, 101].  
Health workers are also likely to share their experiences with colleagues and may thus 
influence the supply of health workers to underserved areas as well as participation in 
financial-incentive programs.  The reviewed studies offer some insight into the 
mechanism through which individual programs affect participant satisfaction.  This 
evidence, based on case reports and participants’ accounts, suggests that programs that 
achieved high participant satisfaction successfully interacted with participants during 
different stages of program enrolment, viz. participant selection, the matching of 
underserved areas to the preferences of individual participants, preparation of the 
participants and their family before the start of the obligated service, as well as career 
guidance, mentoring, monitoring of problems, and ongoing support during the service 
[12, 48, 58, 66, 70, 77].  Detailed case studies of relatively successful and unsuccessful 
programs could further improve our understanding of management skills, organizational 
processes, and program features that increase participant satisfaction and retention in 




32Fifth, there is no clear evidence that financial-incentive programs had any impact on the 
supply of health workers to underserved areas.  The results of three studies suggest that 
certain programs led to an increase in health worker numbers or densities, while two 
other studies did not find such program impacts.  This discrepancy could be due to actual 
differences in impact between programs or over time; or they could be caused by 
methodological limitations of the studies.  Program impact on health worker numbers and 
densities is not only a function of the scale of financial-incentive programs as well as 
recruitment and retention of individual obligated health workers, but also of the effect of 
obligated health workers on the supply of non-obligated health workers in underserved 
communities.  It is plausible that obligated health workers will deter non-obligated 
workers from practice in underserved communities because the former will compete with 
the latter for patients and practice personnel.  Conversely, it also seems plausible that the 
inflow of obligated health workers into underserved communities attracts non-obligated 
workers to the same communities because the former decrease the overall work load per 
health worker and increase opportunities for referral and exchange among colleagues.  A 
study by Pathman and colleagues is thus significant insofar as it suggests “that the NHSC 
contributed positively to the non-NHSC primary care physician workforce in the rural 
underserved counties where its clinicians worked during the 1980s and 1990s” [55].   
In the above discussion of summary findings from our review, we caution that the 
existing evidence regarding program results, effects, and impacts does not allow (strong) 
causal inferences.  It is further important to keep in mind that the summaries are across 5 
countries, 5 types of programs, programs of different geographic reach ranging from 
community to country, 7 types of health workers, and study publication dates ranging 
 
 
33from 1963 to 2008.  Program recruitment, retention, and satisfaction outcomes differed 
widely, even within some of the strata defined by program location, type, geographical 
reach, health worker type, and time period.  Health planners can use our review to gain an 
overview of the existing evidence.  In designing future programs, however, they need to 
carefully consider the specific health worker group they want to target with a program 
and the underserved areas to be covered.   
 
Conclusion 
Financial-incentive programs for return of service are one of the few health policy 
interventions to improve the distribution of human resources for health on which 
substantial evidence exists.  However, the majority of studies to date are from the US and 
only one study reports findings from a developing country.  The existing studies show 
that financial-incentive programs placed substantial numbers of health workers in 
underserved areas and that program participants were more likely than non-participants to 
work in underserved areas in the long run, even though they were less likely to remain at 
their site of original placement.  As all existing studies were observational and 
participants self-selected into programs, the existing evidence does not allow the 
inference that financial-incentive programs can cause increases in health worker supply 
to underserved areas.  In order to improve the scope of evidence on financial-incentive 
programs for return of service in underserved areas, future studies should evaluate 
programs from a more diverse set of countries, in particular in the developing world.  In 
these studies, researchers should attempt to control selection biases as rigorously as 
 
 
34possible, using selection models in observational studies and randomized controlled trials 
where funders and policy makers are willing to support such experiments. 
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     10,626 articles identified from databases 
    6,437in PubMed 
   2,513 in EMBASE 
1,238 in CINAHL 
   438 in NHS EED 
10,495 unique articles identified 
10,302 citations excluded based on screening of titles and abstracts 
•  Intervention does not include a financial incentive for return of 
service in patient care 
•  No quantitative data 
•  Review studies 
•  Editorials or commentaries 
•  News or policy briefs 
176 articles excluded after full-text review 
•  Intervention does not include a financial incentive for return of 
service in patient care 
•  Program tries to increase the number of health workers in 
underserved areas primarily through non-financial means 
•  Financial-incentive programs to enroll in the military, to take up 
research positions, or to enroll in specific residency programs  
•  No quantitative data 
•  Review studies 
•  Studies investigating the attractiveness of hypothetical financial-
incentive programs 
•  Editorials or commentaries 
•  News or policy briefs 
131 duplicate articles eliminated 
25 articles identified in  
     reference lists and by  
     colleagues 
  
 
218 potentially relevant articles identified for further review 
42 articles included in final review Tables 
Table 1 - Study outcomes 
 
Program results 
(Program outcomes among participants) 
Program effects 
(Program effectiveness at the individual 
level) 
Program impacts 
(Program effectiveness at the population 
level) 
 
• Recruitment  
   What proportion of program participants   
   take up practice in an underserved area?  
   (13) 
 
• Retention 
   What proportion of program participants   
   continue to practice in an underserved  
   area at some period of time after   
   completing their obligation? 
   (18) 
 
• Participant satisfaction 
   What proportion of program participants   
   are satisfied with  
-  work in the underserved area 
-  life in the underserved area 
-  other aspects of the financial-
incentive program? 




• Provision of care 
   Does program participation influence the 
   likelihood of individual health workers to 
   provide care in an underserved area? 
   (10) 
 
• Retention 
   Does program participation influence the 
   likelihood of individual health workers to 
   continue to provide care in an  
   underserved area after a certain period of 
   time? 
   (7) 
 
• Participant satisfaction 
   Does program participation influence a  
   health worker’s satisfaction with  
-  work in the underserved area 
-  life in the underserved areas? 
   (2) 
 
• Health system 
   Does the program lead to significant  
   improvements in health system structures 
   (such as physician density)? 
   (6) 
 
• Health 
   Does the program lead to significant  
   improvements in health outcomes (such  
   as mortality)? 





(Program outcomes among participants) 
Program effects 
(Program effectiveness at the individual 
level) 
Program impacts 
(Program effectiveness at the population 
level) 
 
• Family satisfaction 
   What proportion of relatives of program  
   participants are satisfied with  
-  work in the underserved area 
-  life in the underserved area 
-  other aspects of the financial-
incentive program? 
   (3) 
 
The term underserved area in the table encompasses a specific underserved area, any underserved area, and underserved populations.  The number of studies 
investigating a topic is shown in parentheses.  The numbers in parentheses add up to 75 rather than 42 (i.e., the number of studies included in this review) 























Location  Period  Objective  Target group  Definition of 
underserved area 































with a population 
of 5,000 or less 
(subsequently 
raised to 10,000 or 
less) 
Scholarships for medical students: 
Total of USD 1,300 per year over 4 years 
(between 1930 and 1944; amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 13,405 in 
1930 and 12,719 in 1944).  
In return, the students agree to spend not 
less than 3 years in practice in an 
underserved area in their state of origin. 
Fitz et al. 
1977 [75] 
N/A 










































below a certain 
threshold, rural 
community, rural 
county, rural area, 
“area of critical 
need”, anywhere in 
the state) 
Scholarships and loans with service 
option for medical students: 
Between USD 1,000 and USD 2,775 per 
year for 2-4 years (in 1970; lower amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 4,438, 
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underserved area 






















“[A]ny town or 
village having less 
than 2,500 
population 
according to the 
last decennial 
census, or area 
outside such towns 
or villages, or area 
approved by the 
Medical Care 
Commission that is 
considered to meet 
the spirit and intent 
of the student loan 
program” 
 
Loans for students: 
USD 1,600 per year for unmarried 
students (in 1963; amount equivalent to 
year-2000 USD 9,000) and USD 1,900 
for married students (in 1963; amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 10,687).  
For each year the loan is received, the 
students agree to practice in an 
underserved area for one year. The loans 
bear an interest rate of 2%, beginning at 
the time the loan is advanced. The loans 
are repaid in monthly installments of 2% 
of the total amount borrowed, 











Arizona, US  Since 
1953 
“[T]o increase 











Any area in 
Arizona 
Payments to medical schools to reduce 
students’ tuition: 
USD 2,000 (in 1953; amount equivalent 
to year-2000 USD 12,899), raised to USD 
6,000 (by 1977; amount equivalent to 
year-2000 USD 17,050). 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to practice 2 years 
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Designation of an 
area as 
underserved area 
decided by a 
committee 
composed of 
members of the 
MoH, based on 
multiple factors: 
“[n]umber of 
doctors in the area” 
and “their age and 




profile of the 
population, 
“[s]ocioeco-nomic 






and office facilities 
for physicians”, 





Scholarships for medical students: 
CAD 5,000 per year (in 1987; amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 5,921).  
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to spend one calendar 
year in general practice in an underserved 
area after completion of internship. 
Direct financial incentives for physicians: 
CAD 10,000 per year served in an 
underserved area for a maximum of four 
years (between 1980 and 1988; amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 17,591 in 
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Rural areas of 
Japan.  The rural 
areas to which 
JMU graduates are 
sent are determined 







Scholarships for medical students: 
Full scholarships cover “tuition, entrance 
and equipment fees and living expenses 
for the 6 years of study at JMS” [45]. 
In return, participants “are committed to 
working for medical institutions in their 
home prefecture for 9 years after 
graduation. … The 9-year obligation 
usually includes 3 years of post-graduate 
training and 6 years of rural dispatch (i.e., 
duty” [60]. 
 
Inoue et al. 
1997 [45]; 
Inoue et al. 
2007 [59]; 
Matsumoto 
et al. 2008a 
[60]; 
Matsumoto 
et al. 2008b 
[61]; 
Matsumoto 
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HPSA status can 




status is assigned 







indicators of need 
(such as infant 
mortality) and 




Scholarships for students: 
Full scholarships covering tuition, fees, 
and “other reasonable educational 
expenses, such as books, supplies, and 
equipment” [46].   
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to serve one year at a 
location designated as HPSA, with a 
minimum commitment of 2 years. 
Loan repayments for physicians: 
Maximum repayment of USD 25,000 per 
year for a required initial 2-year contract 
(in 2007; amount equivalent to year-2000 
USD 20,336). One year amendments for 
a maximum of USD 35,000 per year (in 
2008; amount equivalent to year-2000 
USD 28,470).  





Brown et al. 
1990 [42]; 















et al. 1996 
[77]; 
Cullen et al. 
1997 [78]; 
Xu et al. 
1997a [87]; 
Xu et al. 
1997b [86]; 
Singer et al. 
1998 [83]; 
Rabinowitz 
et al. 2000 
[85]; 
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Brooks et al. 
2003 [11]; 
Porterfield 
et al. 2003 
[63]; 
Probst et al. 
2003 [52]; 
Holmes 
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underserved area 
































Scholarships for medical students: 
Ranging from USD 650 to 11,000 per 
year (in 1980; lower amount equivalent to 
year-2000 USD 1,358 and higher amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 22,988). 
  








Oklahoma, US  Since 
1975 
“[T]o increase 
















Scholarships for medical students: 
USD 15,500 per year over 4 years (in 
2008; amount equivalent to year-2000 
USD 12,202). 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to practice one year in 
a rural community in Oklahoma (after 
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Indian Health Service Corps: 
Up to USD 20,000 per year (in 2006; 
amount equivalent to year-2000 USD 
17,083). 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to serve one year in an 
Indian health program, with a minimum 
commitment of 2 years (Indian Health 
Service 2006). 
State scholarships: 
See above and below. 
State loan repayment programs 
See above and below. 
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underserved area 









































Rural hospitals in 
the NSW Rural 
Hospital Network 
Scholarships for medical students: 
AUD 15,000 per year over the two final 
years of medical school (in 2007; amount 
equivalent to year-2000 USD 12,458).  
In return, the students agree to serve 2 of 
their first 3 postgraduate years in a rural 
hospital belonging to the NSW Rural 
Hospital Network. 
Dunbabin et 
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HPSA  CSP: scholarships for medical students:  
Amount determined by HPSA 
community who co-sponsors the 
scholarship (with additional funding from 
federal and state funds). 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to serve one year in the 
HPSA where their home is located 
HSSP: scholarships for medical students: 
USD 10,000 (in 2001; amount equivalent 
to year-2000 USD 9,725) 
For the award, the students agree to serve 
2 years in an underserved area. 
RRCP: direct financial incentives to 
medical residents, physicians, and other 
qualified health personnel: 
Maximum of USD 20,000 per year for up 
to 6 years (in 2001; amount equivalent to 
year-2000 USD 19,450) 
For each year the award is received, the 
recipients agree to serve 1 year in an 
underserved area. 
SLRP: direct financial incentives to 
physicians and other qualified health 
professionals: 
Maximum of USD 40,000 (in 2001; 
amount equivalent to year-2000 USD 
38,901) for a commitment to serve 2 
years at a non-profit site in a HPSA.  The 
award can be received twice. 
Jackson et 
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Across all programs on average USD 
14,000 per year of service (in 1996; 
amount equivalent to year-2000 USD 
15,365) (differences between award 
means of the 5 program types not 
significant, p = 0.55). 
Scholarship programs: 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to serve 1 year in an 
underserved area. 
Loan programs with service option: 
The medical students can either repay the 
loan at standard interest rates or repay the 
loan by serving 1 year in an underserved 
area per year of receipt of loan. 
Loan repayment programs: 
Medical residents commit to service in an 
underserved area in exchange for loan 
repayment (commitment usually near the 
end of residency training).  
Direct financial-incentive programs for 
medical residents: 
Medical residents commit to service in an 
underserved area in exchange for 
monetary reward (commitment usually at 
the beginning of the residency).  
Direct financial-incentive programs for 
fully trained health professionals: 
Medical residents commit to service in an 
underserved area in exchange for a 
monetary reward (commitment usually 
near the end of residency training). 
 
Pathman et 
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who have been 





least 2 weeks 
of work 
experience at 










Scholarships for students admitted to a 
tertiary health care education institution: 
“Funds for university tuition, books, 
residence fees and food” [47]. 
For each year the scholarship is received, 
the students agree to work one year as 




























Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 























who ever took 
part in the 
program  






Proportion of participants who had 
completed their practice obligation 
by 1973: 
Of 144 participants, 11 (8%) did 
not complete medical school or 
died. 
Of 133 participants available for 
practice, 74 (54%) completed the 
practice obligation and 5 (4%) 
repaid the financial incentive, while 
the remainder defaulted. 
Proportion of participants who 
practiced in small communities in 
1973 (43 years after program start 
and 29 years after program 
cessation): 
Of 99 former recipients still in 
practice in 1973, 50 (51%) 
practiced in communities of less 
than 25,000 population. 
 
Almost half of 
all participants 
did not fulfill 
their obligation 
to practice in an 
underserved 
area.  








































Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 
























one of the state 
programs and 
were available 
for practice in 
1970 
(N = 1,089) 
 
Records of the 
individual state 
programs 
Proportion of participants who had 
completed or were completing their 
practice obligation in 1970: 
Of 1,089 participants available for 
practice, 658 (60%) completed or 
were completing their obligation 
and 406 (37%) repaid the financial 
incentive, while the remainder 
defaulted. 
Proportion of participants who 
remained in any rural community in 
their state after completion of their 
practice  obligation (neither date of 




North Carolina: 65% 
 
Two fifths of 
participants did 
not fulfill their 
obligation to 



























































Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 























who were ever 




(N = 320) 
 




Proportion of participants who had 
completed or were completing their 
practice obligation in 1963: 
Of 320 participants, 120 (38%) 
were still in school, post-graduate 
training or served in the military, 46 
(14%) withdrew from school or 
failed academically, and 13 (4%) 
withdrew their application or had 
died. 
Of 141 participants available for 
practice, 106 (75%) had completed 
or were completing their practice 
obligation and 35 (25%) defaulted 
on their obligation. 
Proportion of participants who 
intend to leave practice location 
after completion of their practice 
obligation: 
Of 36 respondents 29 (81%) stated 
that they intended to remain in their 
community, while 6 (17%) planned 
further training and one planned a 
move to an urban area. 
Proportion of participants who 
found the loan amount sufficient:  
Of  38 respondents who provided a 
valid answer to the question “Did 
you find the amount of the loan 
sufficient together with your 
resources to alleviate any undue 
concern over financial problems 
during the time you were in 
school?” 29 (76%) answered “yes”, 
while the remainder answered “no”. 
A quarter of 
participants did 
not fulfill their 
obligation to 

































Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




 Proportion of participants who 
would participate again in the same 
program: 
Of 38 respondents who provided a 
valid answer to the question 
whether they would participate 
again in the financial-incentive 
program 27 (71%) answered “yes”, 







Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 






































(N = 149) 






Proportion of participants who had 
completed or were completing their 
practice obligation in 1975: 
Of 149 participants, 67 (45%) 
served their obligation in a 
metropolitan area within Arizona, 
21 (14%) served their obligation in 
a non-metropolitan area in Arizona 
and 55 (37%) repaid the financial 
incentive, while the remainder 
defaulted.  
Proportion of participants who 
remained in rural communities of 
their state after completion of their 
practice  obligation: 
>85% 
Time series of medical student 
density in Arizona: 
The per-capita number of medical 
students did not increase from 1953 
to 1967 (consistently 20% below 
national average), but increased 
steeply from 1968 onwards.  
About two-fifths 
of participants 
did not fulfill 
their obligation 










did not succeed 





steep increase in 
per-capita 
medical students 
in 1968 is 
attributed to the 
opening of the 
first medical 
school in 
















No analysis of 
time series 
undertaken 
except for visual 
impression 
No control for 
confounding by 
other variables 








Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




























(N = 104) 
 
7 annual values 
(1966-1972) of 
the number of 
physicians in 















Proportion of participating medical 
students who had completed or 
were completing their practice 
obligation in 1974: 
Of 104 students, 55 (53%) 
completed or were completing their 
obligation and 49 (47%) repaid the 
financial incentive. 
 
Proportion of students who in 1974 
had remained in the original 
placement location after completion 
of their practice obligation: 
74%  
 
Time series of total number of 
physicians (expressed relative to 
their 1966 baseline value): 
From 1966 to 1972 monotonic 
increase in the relative number of 
physicians in all Ontario (from 1.0 
to over 1.3) and in northern Ontario 
(from 1.0 to almost 1.2). 
From 1966 to 1969 slight decline in 
the relative number of physicians in 
communities in northern Ontario 
with population of less than 15,000 
(i.e., before the program was 
introduced) and steep increase from 
1970 (after introduction of the 
program) to 1972 (from 1.0 to 
almost 1.25). 
 
About half of 
participants did 
not fulfill their 
obligation to 












The time series 


























No analysis of 
time series 
undertaken 
except for visual 
impression 


















Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 





















located) vs. in 
Ontario 








UAP in 1969)  











Physician population density in 
1986 relative to physician 
population density in 1956: 
1.86-4.88 across the 10 northern 
counties 
Location quotient (physician 
density in the counties of northern 
Ontario relative to the physician 
population density in Ontario as a 
whole) in 1986 relative to location 
quotient in 1956: 
0.88-1.33 across the northern 10 
counties  
 




over the 30-year 
observation 
period suggests 





(where most of 
the underserved 
areas in Ontario 
are located) was 
caused by an 
overall increase 
in physicians in 
the state rather 











(because not all 
communities in 










Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 





















from JMU in 
one of first 
eighteen 
graduation 
cohorts of the 
university  
(N = 1,871) 
Mail survey of 
JMU graduates 
in 1995 
Proportion of participants who had 
“observed the contract in 
compliance with the conditions for 
receiving financial aid” by 1995: 
Of 1871 participants 1796 (96%), 
had observed the contract, while 75 
(4%) had “repaid the loans to 
dissolve the contract requiring them 
to complete 9 years of medical 
employment in a rural area”. 
Proportion of participants who in 
1995 were still practicing in the 
prefecture of original placement 
after completion of their practice 
obligation: 
Of 924 participants who had 
completed their obligation in 1995 
620 (67%) were still practicing in 
the prefecture of original 
placement. 
Proportion of participants who in 
1995 were still practicing in a rural 
area after completion of their 
practice obligation: 
Of 924 participants who had 
completed their obligation in 1995 
305 (33%) were still practicing in a 
rural area. 
 







































Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 






JMU  Inoue et al. 
2007 [59]   
Recruitment 
  Program 
effect: 
Provision of 























Proportion of participants who had 
completed or were completing their 
rural practice obligation in 1994: 
“Only 2% of JMS [Jichi Medical 
School] did not observe the rural 
practice obligation” [59]. 
Proportion of participants of all 
physicians in Japan vs. proportion 
of participants in rural areas: 
Participants “accounted for only 
0.7% of all the physicians in Japan. 
However, they accounted for 4.2%, 
1.5%, 1.8%, and 3.0% of the 
physicians in small population, 
























due to selective 
participation in 
























 (N = 1,635) and 
2004  




(N = 228,825) 
and 2004 
(N = 260,041) 
 
Mail surveys of 





surveys of those 
participants who 
did not respond 






Proportion of physicians who 
practice in any rural area: all JMU 
graduates vs. JMU graduates after 
completion of their practice 
obligation vs. non-JMU graduates: 
21.3% vs. 12.8% vs. 3.3% (in 1994) 













about four times 
more likely to 






due to selective 
participation in 
the JMU not 
controlled for 
 







Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 


























(N = 1,929) 
Mail surveys in 
2000, 2004, and 




surveys of those 
participants who 
did not respond 
to the mail 
survey. 
 
Proportion of JMU graduates who 
practice in the prefecture of 
original placement  after 
completion of their practice 
obligation: graduates of rural 
background vs. graduates of urban 
background: 
73.8% vs. 74.7% (p<0.76) 
Proportion of JMU graduates who 
practice in any rural area after 
completion of their practice 
obligation: graduates of rural 
background vs. graduates of urban 
background: 
21.1% vs. 12.0% (p<0.001) 
Odds ratio of retention in the 
prefecture of original placement: at 
first practice site: graduates of 
rural background vs. graduates of 
urban background: 
aOR = 0.77 (p = 0.16), when 
controlling for sex, age at entrance 
into JMU, years after graduation, 
type of high school, parental 
academic background, and change 
of academic standing throughout 
























rural areas was 


















Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




Odds ratio of retention in any  rural 
area: graduates of rural 
background vs. graduates of urban 
background: 
aOR = 1.98 (p = 0.001), when 
controlling for sex, age at entrance 
into JMU, years after graduation, 
type of high school, parental 
academic background, and change 
of academic standing throughout 
undergraduate medical training 
 
JMU Matsumoto 















JMU by 1991  
(N = 1,477) 
Mail surveys in 
2000, 2004, and 




surveys of those 
participants who 
did not respond 
to the mail 
survey. 
 
Proportion of participants who had 
completed the rural practice 
obligation by 2000: 
Of 1,477 participants, 1,255 (85%) 
had completed the obligation, 127 
(9%) were still under contract due 
to contract extension, 69 (4.7%) 
dissolved the contract, and 26 (2%) 
could not be contacted. 
Proportion of participants who had 
completed their practice obligation 
by 2000 and had thereafter 
remained in the prefecture of 








practice in an 
underserved 
area. 















Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 
































October 1975 to 
October 1976 




receive a NHSC 
physician before 
August 1975 
and had never 
been staffed up 
to August 1977 










Staffed communities had 
significantly higher median family 
income, lower poverty prevalence, 
higher income growth, lower infant 
mortality, lower unemployment, 
and higher median educational 
attainment. 
Discriminant analysis: 
Seven variables contribute 
significantly and substantially to 
separation given the other variables 
in the discriminant function (sign of 
coefficient in parentheses): income 
growth (-), poverty prevalence (-), 
physician population density (-), 
employment ratio (+), infant 
mortality rate (-), median family 
income (+), proportion of people 65 









health were less 














only the first 







are measured at 
the level of the 
county) 
 

















Virginia at the 
time of the 
survey 
(N = 100) 
 
Mail survey  Proportion of NHSC physicians 
who intend to practice in a rural 
area after completion of their 
practice  obligation: 
Of 100 physicians 56 (56%) 
expressed intention to practice in a 
rural area, 15 (15%) were uncertain, 
and the remainder did not intend to 
practice in a rural area. 
 







practice in a 











practice in a 
rural area and 









Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




NHSC  Stone et al. 
1991 [41] 
and Brown 






















(N = 401) 
Mail survey  Proportion of participants who 
intended to leave NHSC practice 
location after completion of their 
practice obligation: 
Of 397 respondents who provided 
valid information on their intention 
to leave their NHSC practice 
location, 265 (67%) stated that they 
intended to leave. 
Proportion of participants who 
intended to leave their NHSC 
practice location who provided the 
following reasons for leaving:  
“The most commonly cited reasons 
for leaving (each respondent could 
give two primary reasons) were: 1) 
the site was geographically isolated 
or was unpleasant in some other 
way (61 percent); 2) salary at the 
NHSC site was insufficient (31.5 
percent); 3) on-call and clinical 
responsibilities associated with the 
NHSC position were excessive 
(28.5%); and 4) children’s needs or 
spouse’s career or other needs were 
unmet (26.2%)” [41]. 
  






















salary, and the 
workload, as 
well as unmet 






















Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




NHSC Pathman  et 















practicing in a 
rural county 
who were 
selected in a 
national 
stratified sample 
in 1981, were 
still alive in 
1990, could be 
contacted and 
responded to a 
mail survey in 
1990 











at Chapel Hill 
 
Hazard ratio of non-retention in the 
same practice as in 1981: NHSC vs. 
non-NHSC physicians: 
2.11 (p < 0.0001) 
1.98 (p = 0.0002), when controlling 
for training in internal medicine and 
stated importance of small 
community living 
Hazard ratio of non-retention in 
any rural practice: NHSC vs. non-
NHSC physicians: 
1.74 (p < 0.004) 
1.56 (p = 0.02), when controlling 
for training in internal medicine and 





twice as likely 




about 50% more 







due to selective 
participation in 










Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 























responded to a 
mail survey in 
1990 and who 
had worked 
during any part 
of 1981 in one 
of 192 practices 
that had been 









(N = 202) 
 
Mail survey in 
1990 
Proportion of physicians who still 
worked in a non-metropolitan 
county in 1990: NHSC vs. non-
NHSC physicians: 
24% vs. 52% (p < 0.001) 
Proportion of physicians who still 
worked in the same practice in a 
non-metropolitan county in 1990: 
NHSC vs. non-NHSC physicians: 











were about half 
as likely to 
remain in a non-
metropolitan 
area and about 
three times less 
likely to remain 
in the same 
practice than 
non-
participants.   
Observational 
study 




due to selective 
participation in 
the NHSC not 
controlled for 
 
























Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 














































obligation in a 
rural HPSA 
from 1987 to 
1990 






age and career 
stage who began 
working in a 
rural HPSA 
from 1987 to 
1990   
(N = 206) 
Mail survey in 
1991 
Proportion of physicians who 
remained at first practice site: 
NHSC vs. non-NHSC physicians: 
57% vs. 70% (OR = 0.56, p = 
0.004) after 3 years and 1 month 
21% vs. 52% (OR = 0.25, p < 
0.001) after 5 years and 1 month 
aOR = 0.41 (p = 0.01) after 5 years 
and 1 month, when controlling for 
measures of community-physician 
match and physician and family 
satisfaction 
Mean satisfaction score: NHSC 
physicians: 
Across 18 dimensions of 
satisfaction, 9 mean satisfaction 
scores were between “dissatisfied” 
and “neutral”,  8 were between 
“neutral” and “satisfied”, and one 
(“Caring for needy patients”) was 











Five years after 
starting work at 
a practice site, 
participants 
were less than 
half as likely as 
non-participants 
to have 















due to selective 
participation in 








Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




Mean satisfaction score: NHSC vs. 
non-NHSC physicians: 
Across 15 dimensions of 
satisfaction, NHSC physicians 
reported significantly lower 
satisfaction than non-NHSC 
physicians for “Referral Access to 
Consultants”, “Freedom from 
Bureaucratic Interference”, 
“Clinical Autonomy”, 
“Opportunities to Achieve 
Professional Goals”, “Earnings 
From Practice”, “Quality Physician-
Patient Relationships”, “Life in a 
Small Community”, “Climate or 
Geography”, “Access to Cultural 
Activities”, “Having Amenities of 
City Living” (all p ≤ 0.006), and 
reported higher satisfaction only for 
“Caring for Needy Patients” (p = 
0.003).  






















Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 





















All primary care 
physicians 
placed through 
NHSC in a 
HPSA between 
1987 and 1990 
(N = 398) 
Mail survey in 
1991 
Proportion of physicians who 
remained in practice entered 
between 1987 and 1990: minority 
vs. non-minority NHSC physicians: 
15% vs. 21% (RR = 0.71, p = 0.24), 
one year after having completed the 
practice obligation 
Mean  satisfaction score: minority 
vs. non-minority NHSC physicians: 
Across 17 dimensions of 
satisfaction, all mean satisfaction 
scores for both minority and non-
minority physicians were between 
“dissatisfied” and “satisfied”, with 
the exception of the score for 
“Caring for needy patients” which 
was between “satisfied” and “very 
satisfied” for both groups. 
Minority physicians had 
significantly lower mean scores 
than their non-minority peers for 
“Clinical autonomy”, 
“Opportunities to achieve 
professional goals”, “Earnings from 
practice”, “Opportunities for 
outdoor sports”, “Life in a rural 
community”, “Climate or 
geography”, and “Ability to find 








not differ in 
their retention in 
































Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




Proportion of minority vs. non-
minority NHSC physicians who 
disagreed with statement on family 
satisfaction: 
“spouses knew what to expect when 
they came to their community”: 
38% vs. 24% (p = 0.02) 
“spouses were employed happily in 
the community”: 51% vs. 32% (p = 
0.004). 
Proportion of minority vs. non-
minority NHSC physicians who 
agreed with statement on family 
satisfaction: 
“spouses were unhappy in the 
community”: 45% vs. 34% (p = 
0.07) 
“children were happy in the 









Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




NHSC Rosenblatt  et 














































obligation in a 
rural area, and 
responded to the 
survey 
(N = 258) 
 





















Proportion of NHSC physicians 
who remain in the country of 
original placement (an average of 
6.1 years after the end of their 
practice obligation):  
25% 
Proportion of NHSC physicians 
who have left the county of original 
placement to practice in a rural 
county:  
27% 
Proportions of NHSC physicians 
whose written accounts of their 
experience with the NHSC were 
characterized by an independent 
investigator as indicating a 
positive, neutral, ambivalent, or 
negative appraisal: 
Of 183 written comments, 41% 
were “either mixed or ambivalent”; 
33% were “positive”; 20% were 
“negative”; and 6% were “neutral” 
  







practice in the 





had left the 
original 
placement site 
to practice in a  
rural county. 


























Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 


























and 1983 and 
were placed in a 
rural county 










Proportion of NHSC physicians 
who remained in their rural county 
of original NHSC placement in 
December 1991: 
13% (among those graduated from 
medical school in 1975-1977) 
17% (1978-1980) 
20% (1981-1983) 
Proportion NHSC physicians who 





8-10 years after 
graduating from 
medical school, 
one fifth of 
participants 
remained in the 
county of their 
original 
placement, 
while two fifths 
remain in a rural 



















Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 


































(N = 1,588) 
 
Mail survey in 
1994 
Odds ratio of physicians’ practice 
in underserved areas: NHSC vs. 
non-NHSC physicians: 
aOR = 3.7 (p < 0.0001) when 
controlling for age, sex, 
race/ethnicity, growing up in an 
underserved areas, family income 
as a child, interest in working in 
underserved area prior to medical 
school, debt, medical school 
experience in an underserved area, 





more likely to 
practice in an 
underserved 








due to selective 
participation in 
the NHSC not 
controlled for 














school in 1983 









(N = 1,581) 
 
Mail survey in 
1993 
Percentage of underserved 
patients: NHSC vs. non-NHSC 
physicians: 
30% vs. 19% 
NHSC enrollment coefficient in 
ordinary least squares regression 
with the percentage of a physician’s 
patients who the physician 
considered to be poor or whose 
primary insurance was Medicaid: 
7.46 (p = 0.0001) when controlling 
for sex, race/ethnicity, family 
income as a child, and growing up 
in an underserved area. 
  
Participants had 









due to selective 
participation in 








Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 






















1, 1990 through 
September 30, 
1992 
(N = 2,654) 
Administrative 




Proportion of physicians who were 
still working at the same community 
health center five years after 
starting their contracts: NHSC vs. 
non-NHSC physicians 
17% vs. 36% 
After five years 




were less than 
half as likely as 
non-participants 
to still work in 




No control of 
confounding 
Selection bias 
due to selective 
participation in 
the NHSC not 
controlled for 
NHSC Rabinowitz 












of all allopathic 
and osteopathic 
physicians with 
a primary care 
specialty who 
graduated from 
a US medical 
school in 1983 
or 1984 










Mail survey in 
1993 
Odds ratio of “providing 
substantial care to the 
underserved”: NHSC vs. non-
NHSC physicians: 
aOR = 2.2 (95% CI 1.6-3.0), when 
controlling for sex, ethnicity, family 
income when growing up, 
childhood in inner-city/rural area, 
strong interest in underserved 
practice prior to medical school, 
clinical experience with the 
underserved during medical school 
 
“Participation in 
the NHSC is the 
only 
experiential 
factor related to 




























(N = 249) 
Mail survey in 
1998 
Proportion of NHSC dentists in 
1998 who provided care to an 
underserved population after 





























Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 














All of Florida’s 
rural primary 
care physicians  
(N = 399) 
and random 






(N = 1,236) 
 
Mail survey in 
2001 
Proportion of survey respondents 
who ever served in the NHSC:  
12.6% of rural primary care 
physicians, 3.3% of suburban 
primary care physicians, and 3.4% 
of urban primary care physicians 
had ever served in the NHSC (p < 
0.01).  
The proportion 
of primary care 
doctors who had 
ever served in 
NHSC is almost 
four times as 
high in rural 
areas as in either 
urban or 
suburban areas.  
Observational 
study 
No control of 
confounding 
Selection bias 
due to selective 
participation in 
the NHSC not 
controlled for 
 
NHSC Porterfield  et 






















(N = 1,250) 
 
Mail survey  Proportion of NHSC participants 
who worked in any underserved 
area in 1998: 
52.5% 
Proportion of NHSC participants 
who worked in any underserved 
area in 1998 by NHSC enrolment 
cohort: 
45.6% (1980-84 cohort) 
54.8% (1985-90 cohort) 
67.8% (1991-97 cohort) 
 
7 to 17 years 




about half of the 
participants still 








due to selective 
participation in 









Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 


























in 1969 or later 











from the Office 
of Research and 








Proportion of Medicaid patients of 
all discharges attended: NHSC 
alumni vs. other physicians 
28% vs. 19% 
Odds ratio of being highly engaged 
in Medicaid inpatient practice (i.e., 
≥29.95% of their discharges were 
Medicaid funded) in 1998: NHSC 
alumni vs. non-NHSC alumni 
physicians: 
aOR = 1.93 (95% CI 1.18-3.13), 
when controlling for physician’s 
sex, ethnicity, medical specialty, 
period of graduation from medical 
school, medical education in South 
Carolina, graduation from a non-US 
medical school 
Participants saw 








due to selective 
participation in 














Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 





















in 1977-1979  
(N = 19,253), 
1982-1984 
(N = 20,757), 
1987-1989 




in 1981, 1986, 





















from the Bureau 
of Primary 






NHSC enrollment coefficients in 
multiple probit regression with 
location in community of first 
practice (five years after first 
observation of practice location) as 
outcome variable: 
Between -0.248 and -0.272 across 
the three graduation cohorts (all p < 
0.01), when controlling for age, 
sex, ethnicity 
-0.466 (not sig.), -0.866 (p < 0.01), 
and -1.748 (p < 0.01) in the 1977-
1979, 1982-1984, and 1987-1989 
cohort, respectively, when 
controlling for age, sex, ethnicity, 
and the effect of self-selection into 
the NHSC 
NHSC enrollment coefficients in 
multiple probit regression with 
practice in any HPSA as outcome 
variable: 
Between 0.528 and 0.745 across the 
three graduation cohorts (all p < 
0.01), when controlling for age, 
sex, ethnicity 
0.482 (not sig.), 0.745 (p < 0.01), 
0.161 (not sig.) in the 1977-1979, 
1982-1984, and 1987-1989 cohort, 
respectively, when controlling for 
age, sex, ethnicity, and the effect of 
self-selection into the NHSC 
 
Participants 
were less likely 





even after the 
effect of self-
selection into 












one of the three 
graduation 
cohorts, once 






















the NHSC may 








Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




NHSC Pathman  et 








(N = 772) 
HPSA counties 
that received 




0 years of 
staffing  
(N = 172) 
1-7 years of 
staffing 
(N = 293) 
8-11 years of 
staffing 
(N = 84) 
12-15 years of 












Age-adjusted all-cause mortality 
rates (standardized to the 1981-




HPSA, 0 years staffing: 
1.022/0.982 
HPSA, 1-7 years staffing:  
1.027/0.992  
HPSA, 8-11 years staffing:  
1.092/1.055 
























counties than in 
all types of 
underserved 
counties with 



















Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 

























(N = 80,184) 
Observation of 
practice location 
in 1981 and 
1986  for the 
1976-1978 
cohort, in 1986 
and 1991 for the 
1981-1983 
cohort, and in 
1991 and 1996 
for the 1986-
1988 cohort 













Predicted supply of physicians in 
underserved areas using parameter 
estimates from a sequential 
multinomial logit model of 
physicians’ location decisions, 
which controls for the effect of self-
selection into the NHSC: under the 
status quo vs. assuming that the 
NHSC were eliminated:  
Elimination of the NHSC would 
lead to a 10-11% decrease in the 




about one tenth 





















the NHSC may 








Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




NHSC Pathman  et 














1984 and at 
least 3 of the 
preceding 5 
years 
(N = 141) 
All rural HPSA 























NHSC staffing coefficients in 
multiple linear regression with 
ratio change in non-NHSC primary 
care physician density from 1981 to 
2001 as outcome variable: 
1.06 (p < 0.01), when controlling 
for population size, ethnic 
composition, per-capita income, 
poverty prevalence, youth 
unemployment rate, education, 
presence of a hospital, presence of a 
community or migrant health 
center, non-NHSC primary care 
physician population density at 
baseline, presence of at least one 
non-NHSC primary care physician 
at baseline 






physicians in an 
underserved 


















active in direct 







training in 1970 
or later  












Odds ratio of work in a community 
health center (in 2001-2003): 
participants in the NHSC loan 
repayment program vs. non-
participants: 
aOR = 6.99 (p < 0.001) when 
controlling for sex, year of 
residency completion, private vs. 
public medical school, attendance 





more likely to 









due to selective 
participation in 








Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 


















supported by the 
scholarship 
between 1973 
and 1977 and 
had graduated in 
1980 





Proportion of participants who 
practiced in the Navajo Indian 
reservation or immediately 
adjacent communities after 
graduation: 
Of 124 participants, 34 (27%) 
continued their education, 9 (7%) 
were lost to follow-up or died, 5 
(4%) were unemployed and 76 
(62%) were employed 
Of the 76 participants available for 
practice, 56 (74%) worked in the 
Navajo Indian reservation or 
immediately adjacent communities, 
while the remainder did not serve in 
those areas. 
 
























Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




















1976 to 1985 







Proportion of participants who 
fulfilled their practice obligation: 
Of 138 students, 94 (68%) fulfilled 
their practice obligation, while 44 

















































Proportion of participants who 
fulfilled their practice obligation: 
Of 544 participants available for 
practice, 407 (75%) had completed 
or were completing their practice 
obligation and 138 (25%) repaid the 
financial incentive.
5
Proportion of participants who 
remained in the original placement 
community upon completion of their 
practice  obligation: 
Of 313 students, 167 (53%) 
remained in the original placement 
community, 91 (29%) relocated to 
another community in Oklahoma, 
and 55 (18%) relocated to another 
state. 
 




practice in an 
underserved 
area. 
About half of 
participants 
















                                                 








Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




































in either 1988 or 
1992 and were 
listed four years 
after graduation 














Proportions of financial-incentive 
program participants vs. non-
participants who practiced in any 
rural area in 1999: 
33.3 vs. 6.5% (p < 0.001) 
Average proportion of Medicaid 
and uninsured patients of all 
patients who are cared for by 
participants vs. non-participants in 
1999: 
54.1 vs. 29.4% (p < 0.001) 
The positive association of 
participation with practice in rural 
areas and with the proportion of 
Medicaid and uninsured patients 
remained significant “while 
controlling for selected 









about five times 
more likely to 
practice in rural 
areas and 85% 




















Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 















































(N = 82) 
 







Mail survey in 
2004 
Proportion of participants (1989-
2004 cohort) who had completed or 
were completing their practice 
obligation in 2004: 
Of 157 participants, 4 (3%) did not 
graduate from medical school. 
Of the 153 participants who 
graduated from medical school, 133 
(87%) had completed or were 
completing their practice obligation 
and 20 (13%) withdrew from the 
program. 
Proportion of participants (1989-
1998 cohort) who had completed 
their rural service and (in 2004) 
were practicing in a rural 
community: 
Of 82 former cadets, 35 (43%) were 
working in a rural area (compared 
















































Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




















in at least 1 of 
the 4 incentive 
programs who 
had completed 
at least 1 year of 
their obligation 
(N = 105 for 
study of 
program result, 
N = 44 for study 
of program 
effect) 






in West Virginia 
counties defined 
as “rural” by 
both the federal 
Office of 
Management 
















Mail survey in 
2002 
Proportion of participants who had 
completed or were completing their 
practice obligation in 2002: 
Of 105 participants available for 
practice, 82 (78%) had completed 
or were completing their practice 
obligation and 23 (22%) repaid the 
financial incentive. 
Comparison of the proportion of 
participants vs. the proportion of 
all other primary care physicians 
who were still practicing at their 
first practice site in 2002: 
“Obligated physicians were less 
likely to leave their service sites 
during the first 4 years of practice 
than were nonobligated physicians. 
After obligations were completed 
and physicians were free to leave, 
retention dropped into the range 
seen among nonobligated 
physicians.” 
After 4 years, 32% of all 
participants were no longer at their 
first practice site, compared with 
38% of all other primary care 











practice in an 
underserved 
area. 
Retention in the 









The majority of 
participants in 










No control of 
confounding 
Selection bias 






























                                                 







Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




Proportion of financial-incentive 
program participants vs. non-
participants  who “agreed that 
clinical work was personally 
rewarding” 
98% vs. 85% (p = 0.02) 
Proportions of participants who 
were dissatisfied with program 
personnel 
Across the different evaluated 
programs “one third to half of 
recipients of all programs felt they 
had too little contact, assistance, 
and responsiveness” from program 
personnel. 
Proportion of participants who 
would participate again in the same 
program  
Of 41 program participants who 
provided a valid answer when 
asked whether “they would sign up 
for their financial incentive 
program again” 30 (73%) answered 
“definitely yes” or “probably yes”, 
while the remainder answered 
“definitely not” or “probably not”. 
















Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




















































in 1991 or 1996 
(N = 330) 
Stratified 
random sample 
of all graduates 
of US allopathic 
and osteopathic 
medical schools 
in 1988 and 
1992 who 4 
years after 
graduation were 
in primary care 
practice in the 
US and were not 
obligated to 
serve in a 
specific location 







Records of the 
individual state 
programs 







Mail survey in 
1998 and 1999 
Proportion of program participants 
who had completed their practice 
obligation by 2004: 
44.7% (average of service-option 
loan programs) 
66.5% (average of scholarship 
programs) 
93.0% (average of all other 
programs) 
Proportion of program participants 
who had repaid the financial 
incentive by 2004: 
49.2% (average of service-option 
loan programs) 
27.2% (average of scholarship 
programs) 
2.3% (average of all other 
programs) 
Hazard ratio of retention at first 
practice site: program participants 
vs. program non-participants: 
0.70 (p = 0.029) 
0.75 (p = 0.080), when controlling 





















were about 25% 
less likely to 
remain at their 




The majority of 
participants in 

































Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 




Proportion of participants who 
were satisfied with their program 
placement 
More than 70% of obligated 
physicians felt “a sense of 
belonging to the community”; more 
than 80% were “satisfied with 
practice”; and more than 90% 
found their “work rewarding”.  All 
three proportions were lower 
among nonobligated physicians (all 
p ≤ 0.05). 
Proportion of family members who 
were satisfied with program 
placement 
The spouses of obligated physicians 
did not differ significantly in their 
satisfaction with the community 
(more than 50%) or with their work 
(more than 70%) from the spouses 
of nonobligated physicians.  The 
children of obligated physicians did 
not differ significantly in their 
satisfaction with the community 
(more than 80%) from children of 
nonobligated physicians. 
Proportion of participants who 
would participate again in the same 
program 90.2% of obligated 
physicians would “likely” or 
“definitely” participate again in 







Study design  Sample criteria 
and sample size 






















in the program 
between 1999 
and 2002 and 
who graduated 




(N = 24) 
 
FOMSS records  Proportion of participants who 
practiced in Umkhanyakude district 
after graduation: 
Of 24 participants who graduated, 1 
(0.4%) died and 3 (1%) pursued 
further education or training.  Of 20 
participants available for service, 
20 (100%) had completed or were 












OR = odds ratio, aOR = adjusted odds ratio, RR = risk ratio.  The term underserved area in the table encompasses a specific underserved area, any underserved area, and underserved 
populations.  The sample size N refers to the largest number of people included in an analysis of program outcomes reported in a study.  Some outcome analyses in the same study may 
use samples that are smaller than N, for instance, because data on a particular outcome were not available for all individuals.  WWII = Second World War, HPSA = Health Professional 





















Table 4: Studies of program effect on provision of care or retention 
 
   Outcome 
  
Same area as at baseline  Any underserved area 
All physicians  Retention in the same area: 
Holmes 2004 [53] 
Pathman et al. 2004 [48] 
Provision of care in any underserved area: 
Brooks et al. 2003 [11] 
Holmes 2004 [53] 
Inoue et al. 2007 [59] 
Matsumoto et al. 2008a [60] 
Pathman et al. 2000 [84] 
Probst et al. 2003 [52] 
Rabinowitz et. al. 2000 [85] 
Rittenhouse et al. 2008 [65] 
Xu et al. 1997a [87] 
Xu et al. 1997b [86] 
 
Retention in any underserved area: 
Pathman et al. 1992 [81] 
Pathman et al. 1994a [82] 








Physicians who work 
in an underserved area 
at baseline 
Jackson et al. 2003 [58] 
Pathman et al. 1992 [81] 
Pathman et al. 1994a [82] 
Pathman et al. 1994b [12] 








 Appendix: Search algorithms 
 
PubMed search 
 ("Health Manpower"[MeSH Term] OR "Health Personnel"[MeSH Term] OR 
"Students"[MeSH Term] OR “Internship and Residency"[MeSH Term] OR “Education, 
Medical"[MeSH Term]) AND (“Medically Underserved Area”[MeSH Term] OR "Professional 
Practice Location"[MeSH Term]  OR “Rural Health”[MeSH Term] OR “Rural Health 
Services”[MeSH Term] OR "Primary Health Care"[MeSH Term] OR “Family Practice”[MeSH 
Term] OR “Career Choice”[MeSH Term]) AND (“Financial Support"[MeSH Term] OR 




('health care manpower'/exp OR 'health care personnel'/exp OR 'student'/exp OR 'medical 
education'/exp) AND ('rural health care'/exp OR 'professional practice'/exp OR 'primary health 
care'/exp OR 'general practice'/exp) AND ('student assistance program'/exp OR 'finance'/exp 
OR 'health care personnel management'/exp OR 'health care planning'/exp) AND [embase]/lim 
NOT [31-01-2009]/sd AND [<1950-2009]/py 
 
CINAHL search 
 ((MH "Health Manpower+") or (MH "Nursing Manpower+") or (MH "Health Personnel+") or 
(MH "Students+") or (MH "Internship and Residency") or (MH "Education+")) and ((MH 
"Medically Underserved Area") or (MH "Rural Health") or (MH "Rural Health Services") or 
(MH "Primary Health Care") or (MH "Family Practice") or (MH "Career Planning and 
Development")) and ((MH "Financial Support+") or (MH "Employee Incentive Programs") or 
(MH "Health and Welfare Planning+")) 
 
NHS EED search 
 ( ( Health Manpower ) OR ( Health Personnel ) OR ( Students ) OR  
( Internship and Residency ) OR ( Medical Education ) ) AND  
( ( Medically Underserved Area ) OR ( Professional Practice Location ) OR ( Rural Health ) 
OR ( Rural Health Services ) OR ( Primary Health Care ) OR ( Family Practice ) ) AND  
( ( Career Choice ) OR ( Financial Support ) OR ( Training Support ) OR ( Physician Incentive 
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